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GENES, CLONES, AND GENDER EQUALITY
Mary B. Mahowald
INTRODUCTION
The concept of gender neutrality has long had wide appeal to liberal
thinkers. In many areas, gender neutral language attests to this appeal
and suggests that men and women are, and should be treated as,
equals.' Often, gender neutral language is appropriate and desirable on
moral grounds-just as racial or ethnic neutrality is appropriate and
desirable-because such factors are irrelevant in evaluating individuals
as such. In some cases, however, such neutrality is conceptually
misleading and morally inexcusable because it masks inequities that
*Professor, Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Committee on Genetics,
MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics, and The College, University of Chicago. BA.,
St. Francis College, 1965; Ph.D. (Philosophy), Marquette University, 1969.
'See ROSENMAEI TONG, FmNST THOuGmr 11-38 (1989) (discussing liberal feminism).
Rosemarie Tong states:
If [Betty] Friedan is right, then liberalLm is wong to deny the
differences between men and women, to press for gender-neutral laws
andlor gender-blind policies. Thus, the task of the liberal feminist is to
determine not what liberty and equality are for abstract rational perons,
but what liberty and equality are for concrete men and women. This is a
difficult and dangerous task, for, as Rosalind Rosenberg has stated, "If
women as a group are allowed special benefits, you open up the group
to charges that it is inferior. But, if we deny all differences, as the
women's movement has so often done, you deflect attention from the
disadvantages women labor under."
Id at27.
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may then remain unaddressed.2 Affirmative action policies are
defensible on this basis.
3
The field of reproductive endocrinology is one area in which
gender neutral language is prevalently and misleadingly used.
Infertility specialists, for example, refer to infertile couples as if both
partners are infertile when usually only one of them is, and they discuss
infertility treatment as if both partners were being treated when in fact,
it is only the woman who undergoes invasive and painful treatment,
even when, as happens half the time, it is her partner who is infertile.
4
Gender neutral language is also used in referring to parental
responsibility for children and caregiving of the sick, disabled or
elderly. Single parents and caregivers are thus assumed to be men or
women, as if either gender assignment is as likely as the other; in fact,
however, single parents and caregivers are most often women.5 An
interesting exception to the tendency to use gender-neutral language is
the use of the feminine pronoun to refer to nurses when we don't know
whether the individual nurse is male or female. Although the
assumption is occasionally wrong, it is statistically much more
probable that a nurse is female than that a single parent is male.
6
2See id
3See, e.g., Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J.
607, 607 (explaining that affirmative action has its roots in slavery.) Martha S. West states:
Affirmative action programs are a direct outgrowth of our nation's long
and unhappy history of moving away from slavery and toward the goal
of racial equality. I begin with slavery, not because I see affirmative
action as a way to compensate for slavery and other past injustices, but
because of the continuing impact of our unarticulated notion of the
racial superiority of whites and the racial inferiority of persons with
darker skin color.
Id.
4See MA uLL M. SEi, INFRTmrrY: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXT 4-13 (2d ed. 1997).
5See, e.g., Katherine Morton Robinson, Family Caregiving: Who Provides the Care, and
at What Cost?, 15 Nursing Economics 243, 243 (1997) (stating "[s]eventy-two percent of
unpaid family caregivers are women...").
6See, e.g., Janette Y. Taylor, Colonizing Images and Diagnostic Labels: Oppressive
Mechanismsfor African American Women's Health, 21 ADVANCES IN NURsING SCINcE 32, 32
(1999) (discussing the interaction of African American women with "the physician, who is
usually White and male, or nurse, who is usually White and female"); The University of
Arizona College of Nursing <http://daps.arizona.edu/daps/sro/F99/CollegeEnrollmentlNursing
[Vol. 3:495
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Genetics is another field in which gender neutral language is
prevalently and misleadingly used. In fact, however, some genetic
diseases affect only males and are only transmitted by females; others
are expressed differently in males and females, or more severely in one
sex than in another.7 Prenatal testing for genetic diseases and fetal
interventions undertaken after positive results can only be undertaken
through women's bodies, even though men may be responsible for the
genetic condition addressed. 8 The great majority of genetic counselors
are women, and statistically significant gender differences are evident
in attitudes about ethical dilemmas in genetics. 9 Gender differences are
evident not only in the predominance of women in genetic counseling
and other health care settings, but also in their predominance as
informal caregivers of those children, the ill or disabled, and the
/nruMajor.html (listing the statistics for the 1999 college of nursing as 207 females and 21
males). Cf. The Changing Pediatric Practice Environment, 105 AMEi ACADE Y OF
PEDiAnICS 173, 173 (discussing statistics of single-parent families).
The majority of children under 18 living below the poverty line are
found in single-parent, female-headed families. In 1997, these families
comprised 61 percent of the nearly 5.9 million families with children
under 18 living in poverty. In contrast, married-couple families and
those headed by single-male parents constituted about 32 percent and 7
percent, respectively, of the total number of these families. Children of
color are disproportionately represented in poor, single-parent homes.
In 1997, 55 percent of Africa American children and 63 percent of
Latino children lived with single mothers whose incomes fell below the
poverty level, compared with 37 percent of white, non-Latino children.
Id.
7For a delineation of types and examples of gender differences associated -with genetic
conditions, see Mary B. Mahowald, Dana Levinson, Christine Cassel, et a., T7e New Genetics
and Women, 74 THE MnBANK QUARTERLY 239, 239-83 (1996). The issue of human cloning,
however, is not included in this delineation because it was considered biologically impossible
when the data for this article were generated.
8See id at 241, 251.
9According to a survey of genetic counselors in the United States, ninety-five percent are
women and 93 percent are Caucasian. See NATIONAL SOCIEY FOR G NEc CoUazSELRS,
PROFESSIONAL STATUS SURvE, PERsPEcnVES IN GEN=,, CouNsun.Go 1-8 (Supp. 1996).
From a broad survey of medical geneticists, Dorothy Wertz concluded that gender "was the
single most important determinant of ethical decision making and ethical reasoning, over and
above all other personal and professional variables, including nationality, age, number of years
in genetics, type of degree, specialty, religion, religiosity, political inclination, marital status,
number of children, and number of genetics patients seen per week." Wertz, Provider Biase
and Choices: The Role of Gender, 36 CLCAL OBSTEICS & GYNEcoLoGY 3, 524 (1993).
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elderly. 10 In both formal and informal settings, however, women
seldom enjoy the level of prestige or remuneration for their caregiving
that men enjoy.11
Many people equate biological ties to children with genetic ties.12
In fact, however, men can only be biologically related to children
through genetics, but women have three separable types of biological
relationship: genetics, gestation, and lactation. 13  To some women,
gestation, i.e., the experience of pregnancy and childbirth is more
important than the genetic tie.14  This particular gender difference is
relevant to reproductive decisions by individuals who are carriers for
autosomal diseases. 15 If both partners are carriers for an autosomal
recessive disease 16 (e.g., cystic fibrosis or sickle cell anemia), they can
avoid the one in four chance of transmitting the disease to each of their
children by using donor gametes from a noncarrier; 17 in either case, the
carrier woman will be biologically related to the child through
gestation. Both partners may be biologically related if they use a donor
egg rather than donor sperm. If one partner is a carrier for an
l0See Mahowald, supra note 7, at 268.
"Although the number of women in medicine has increased considerably, men still
predominate in positions of leadership in the profession, and women continue to predominate in
the allied health professions such as nursing and genetic counseling. See Thomas Koenig &
Michael Rustad, His And Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WAsH. L. REV.
59, 61 (1995).
'
2See Mahowald, supra note 7, at 264.
13While challenging the term "surrogate motherhood" as applied to women who gestate
and give birth, I identified gestation, genetics, and lactation as three separable types of
biological ties to children in WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN HEALTH CARE: AN UNEQUAL MAJORITY
105 (1996).
4See J.G. Thornton, Would You Rather Be a 'Birth' or a 'Genetic' Mother? If So, How
Much?, 20 L MED. ETHICS 20, 87-92 (1994); Amy J. Ravin, Mary B. Mahowald & Carol B.
Stocking, Genes or Gestation? Attitudes of Women and Men about Biologic Ties to Children, 6
L WomiN's HEALTH 639, 639-47 (1997).
15See DONNA OLENDORF ET AL, THE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1274 (1999)
(describing autosomal disease as caused by a gene located on any of the first 22 chromosomes)
[hereinafter GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA].
16See id. The risk of passing an autosomal disease to a child depends on whether the
gene is dominant or recessive. See id at 1276. A prospective parent carrying a dominant gene
has a 50 percent chance of passing the gene to a child. See Id. A child needs to receive only
one copy of the mutated gene to be affected by the disease. See id. If the gene is recessive, a
child needs to receive two copies of the mutated gene, one from each parent affected. See id
7See id (defining noncarrier as a person without a disease causing gene).
[Vol. 3:495
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autosomal dominant disease ' s (e.g., Huntington chorea ), they may
avoid the one in two chance of transmitting the disease to each of their
children by using donor sperm if the man is the carrier; if the woman is
the carrier and her partner is not, egg donation allows both partners to
have a biological tie to unaffected offspring.
Clearly, then, reproduction, genetics and caregiving are not gender
neutral. But why is this important? Doesn't morality demand
neutrality with regard to differences in gender, class, ability, and race?
Aren't such differences desirable because they bring variety to our lives
and our society? And if it is desirable to preserve differences between
individuals or groups, aren't the differences themselves irrelevant to
moral judgments or policy determinations? In what follows, I will
explain why attention to differences is a moral imperative in
applications of the burgeoning advances in genetics. Although human
cloning is a means through which to reduce genetic differences
between people, I will identify gender differences related to this new
technology and explore their implications for conceptions of
parenthood. Preliminarily, I will briefly consider the meaning of
gender equality that underlies my account.
GENDER EQUALITY AS A SUBSET OF JUSTICE2 0
Considerations of justice are generally viewed as indispensable to any
adequate ethical analysis. But justice, as a moral principle, is open to
different conflicting interpretations, and even when one meaning is
agreed upon, to whom that meaning is to be applied may be a matter of
dispute. Following Aristotle, the formal principle ofjustice is generally
accepted as requiring equals to be treated equally and unequals
"SSee id
19See TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 91S (17th ed. 1993) (defining
Huntington chorea as an autosomal dominant disease of the central nervous system that usually
begins to manifest symptoms between ages thirty and fifty. The patient expariences
progressive dementia with bizarre involuntary movements characteristic of chorca. Many
people have children prior to the disease's development; each of their children has a fifty
percent chance of inheriting the disease.) [hereinafter TABER's].
"This section is taken from MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, GENEs, Wo.mE, EqLunTY 69-
76 (2000) (Chapter 4: Gender Justice in Ethics).
2000]
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unequally, like things to be treated alike.2 1  There is broad
disagreement, however, with regard to the material principle of justice,
which involves the meaning of equality that underlies the formal
principle.22 As Amartya Sen observes, most ethical theories concerning
social arrangements appeal to some conception of equality, with the
differences among them arising from the variables identified as
deserving equal attention or distribution.23 While scholars debate
questions of who should be considered equal and what it means to treat
them equally,24 these questions are probably not debated enough by
political leaders who champion equality as a fundamental social value.
The conception of equality that underlies my approach to ethical
issues in genetics is consistent with Sen's focus on human capability as
differently ex ressed and sometimes suppressed in different individuals
and groups. The suppression, rather than expression of different
human capabilities, is to be eliminated or minimized in the egalitarian
society that Sen and I both support.26 Differences are welcome so long
as they don't advantage one group or individual over another.
27
Equality between the sexes or races or classes does not mean that
different groups are the same but that they have the same value despite
their differences. 2 8 To put this in chromosomal terms, XX29=XY30, ie.,
women and men are not the same but they are equal in value, or to
extend the equation to other chromosomal arrangements,
XX=XY=XXy 31=X032, which means that people with chromosomal
21See generally ARISTOTLE, NICbOmACHEAN ETIcs V 3-5 (1998). Many authors cite
this principle before delineating various material principles or arguing for their own.
22See TOM L BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
330 (1994) (listing six principles, each designating a different criterion for distribution to
individuals: equal shares, need, effort, contribution, merit, and free-market exchange).
23See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALrrY REDEAMIN 3 (1995).24See d at 3.
2'See id. at 5.
2See id at 19-21:
27See id
28See AMARTYA SEN, supra note 23, at 19-21.
29See TABER's, supra note 19, at 2170 (defining XX as the female chromosomal
configuration).30See i d at 2173 (defining XY as the male chromosomal configuration).31See id at 1056 (defining XXY as Klinefelter Syndrome, a congenital endocrine
condition of primary testicular failure).
[Vol. 3:495
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arrangements other than XX and XY also have the same value despite
their differences.
Gender equality thus refers to a situation in which differences
between men and women are acknowledged and respected, while
insuring that they themselves are valued in the same degree. Because
of unchangeable biological differences, women experience burdens and
risks that men do not experience in reproduction and genetics, and
those burdens and risks tend to be greater for women than for men.33
Both formally and informally, however, measures can be introduced to
reduce the inequitable impact of their differences. If reasonable efforts
are made in that direction, the requirements of gender equality may be
met
34
I am not arguing for the elimination or even for the reduction of
capabilities on the part of some in order to equalize their capabilities
with those of others. Rather, I am arguing the advantages that accrue to
some because of their capabilities ought to be equally distributed, or
less unequally distributed, to those who lack such advantages because
of their lesser capabilities. Where equal distribution of advantages is
not possible, there ought to be efforts to reduce the inequality. Morally,
those who are advantaged through greater capabilities bear greater
responsibilities towards those who are less advantaged. In other words,
equitable distribution of advantages is a social ideal worth pursuing-
despite its resonance with the Marxist maxim: from each according to
ability, to each according to need.35
Some differences entail inequalities; others are merely associated
with them. For example, women who provide gametes for
reproduction experience risk and discomfort that men who provide
gametes do not experience (quite the contrary, in most instances);36 this
32See id at 2058 (defining XO as Turner Syndrome, a congenital endocrine disorder in
females caused by the failure of the ovaries to respond to pituitary hormone. Patients have only
forty-five chromosomes; the second X chromosome is absent.).33See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("Maternity, or additional offsprin, may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care").34Admittedly, the criteria for determining "reasonable efforts" are problematic, as
problematic as criteria for determining the "reasonable person" (or "reasonable man") standard
in law and bioethics.35See ROBERT C. TucKER, TRE MARX-ENaLS RE ER 388 (1972).
2000]
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inequality is entailed or necessitated by one's being male or female.
Once children are born, however, the unequal roles prevalently
occupied by mothers or fathers are merely associated with their sex.37
For example, the time spent with children by both parents could be the
same, or the ratio could be reversed. The lesser prestige and income
that typically attaches to caregiving,38  in contrast with other
occupaions, is another disparity that mainly disadvantages women.
This gap could surely be reduced through changes in social attitudes
and practices.
What type of situation should prevail if differences result in
inequality? If gender equality is desirable, efforts should be made to
reduce inequalities occasioned by differences between the sexes.
Where inequitable differences are unchangeable, as in the different
reproductive roles of men and women, measures can still be introduced
to reduce the inequity of their consequences. It may be argued, for
example, that laws granting women alone the right to terminate a
pregnancy are based on the realization that women's bodies and not
men's are affected by those decisions.39 Where inequitable differences
are changeable, then such changes should be made, or at least
attempted, on grounds of justice as a social goal. Alternatively, the
advantages enjoyed by some may be balanced by those of others, so
that the overall impact of changeable differences is equitable.
36See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) ("We are not unmindful of the
fact that the trauma (including both emotional stress and physical discomfort) to which women
are subjected in the IVF process is more severe than is the impact of the procedure on men. In
this sense, it is fair to say that women contribute more to the IVF process than men").
37An exception to this point is the woman's capacity for lactation. While others,
including fathers, are also able to feed infants, only women can nurse them.38See Robinson, supra 5, at 244 ("For many women, caring for an elderly female relative
is an extension of her role as wife, mother, and homemaker. Colliere, in her 1986 feminist
essay, hypothesizes that as 'cure' became a valued activity done by men, 'care' became the
domain of women, thus undervalued and under compensated").39See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("The detriment that the State would
impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice [abortion] altogether is apparent.
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future,
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is
the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to
care for it").
[Vol. 3:495
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Just as differences between men and women need to be identified
and examined to determine the extent, if any, to which they are
associated with disadvantages for one group vis-a-vis others, the same
is true for differences based on race or class or ability or sexual
orientation. Some men, after all, are disadvantaged vis-6.-vis some
women, and some women are disadvantaged vis--vis other women.40
In fact, the majority of us are neither wholly disadvantaged nor wholly
advantaged. 41 Accordingly, while I focus here on gender equality as a
subset of justice, the conception of equality that underlies my analysis
is necessarily applicable to other groups whose differences are
associated with inequality. The issue I target is, ironically, one that
illustrates the very conception of equality as sameness that I reject.
Human cloning is a means of preserving, or at least maximizing,
genetic sameness, 42 and this may be construed by some as a strategy
that promotes equality. Because of inequitable gender differences
associated with cloning, 43 I disagree with that construal. To appreciate
the contrast between these views, however, requires some
understanding of what human cloning would entail for participants in
the process. This understanding may at least partially be obtained by
considering different meanings of cloning and the probability that
techniques employed in nonhuman cloning will be applied to humans.
HUMAN EMBRYO CLONING 4
Human cloning has occurred in nature throughout human history, and
in laboratory science for decades.45 Nature's cloning occurs through
40See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN 2 (1981) (discussing black women's
participation in not only the struggle for racial equality, but also the women's rights
movement).
41See id
42See Can We and Should We Clone Humans? <http'J/wv.cwrl.utexas.edulmehorost
/e306lbeen/cloning.htm.> (explaining that cloning goes through the sare process as in vitro
fertilization; however cloning "destroys its originality through duplication").
43See infra footnotes 44-88 and accompanying text.
4Ti section is taken from MARY BRIODY IMAHOWALD, GENES, Vo:.NI, EQUALT
279-82 (2000) (Chapter 16: Human Cloning, Women, and Parenthood).
45See Rebecca Voelker, A Clone by Any Other Name Is Still an Ethical Concern, 271
JAMA 331, 332 (1994). Jacques Cohen challenges the description of identical twins derived
from embryos as clones, whether they occur naturally or through in vitro manipulation. He
2000]
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identical twinning in vivo before implantation. 46  Scientific cloning
occurs through the replication of genetically identical DNA, cells,
bacteria, viruses, or whole organisms.47 Replication of genes through
recombinant DNA technology48  has led to the development of
treatments such as insulin for diabetes and erythropoietin for anemia.
49
Somatic cells50 are replicated by retrieving them from people and
growing them in culture in the laboratory; like DNA clones, these cell
lines are used for experimental purposes that may lead to clinical
applications. 51
Recombinant DNA technology was controversial when first
proposed, but it is now widely accepted on moral as well as scientific
grounds.52  Although the other methods listed above are also non-
controversial, two forms of human cloning continue to be debated:
cloning from embryonic or fetal cells53 and somatic cell nuclear
calls the latter a "twinning technique," and defines cloning more narrowly: "taking the nucleus
of a cell from the body of an adult and transferring it to an unfertilized egg, destroying the
genome of the oocyte of [sic] the egg, and letting it develop." See id.
4"See id47See idL
4SSee RicK! Ls, HUMAN GENETICS: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 316-17 (2d ed.
1997). Recombinant DNA technology involves the combining of DNA from different species;
this is possible because all living species use the same genetic code. See ia The DNA of
bacteria, for example, may be combined with human DNA, to develop many copies or clones
of the human DNA that investigators wish to examine. See il
49See TABER's, supra note 19, at 97 (stating that anemia exists when hemoglobin content
is less than that required to provide the oxygen demands of the body).
SOSee id at 1827 (stating that somatic pertains to nonreproductive cells or tissues).
$'See Genomics: A Global Resource, Genomics Lexicon, <http://209.52.56.28/lexicon
/s.html> (defining somatic cell gene therapy as therapy that involves "the insertion of genes
into cells for therapeutic purposes, for example to induce the treated cells to produce a protein
that the body is missing.... Somatic cell gene therapy is only one way of applying the science
of genomics to improve healthcare").
52See Donald S. Fredrickson, Asilomar and Recombinant DNA: The End of the
Beginning, in BIoMmiCAL PoLrmcs 274-84 (Kathi E. Hanna ed., 1991).
S3See Davor Solter, Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cells: A New Era in Human Biology
and Medicine <http:llwww.mefst.hr/cmj/1999/4003/400301.htm>. Solter explains:
Another recent technological advance, the derivation of human
embryonic stem cells, opens up new possibilities in cell and tissue
replacement therapy and heralds significant improvements in gene
therapy. Besides suggesting new and potentially valuable medical
applications, the insights gained through the use of these techniques
could significantly enrich our understanding of basic mechanisms
[Vol. 3:495
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transfer54 from humans already born. These methods differ from
natural twinning because they are induced by sciefitific technology;
5s
they differ from DNA and somatic cell replication because they may
produce a genetic duplicate of the entire human organism.
56
Three types of embryo cloning have already been performed in
nonhuman animals: blastomere separation, 57 embryo splitting,53 and
nuclear transplantation.5 9 Blastomere separation occurs through the
isolation of individual cells or blastomeres, each of which is
totipotent, 60 at t wo- or four-cell stage of development.6' Although
the process is expensive and rarely successful, nonhuman animals have
been produced from each of the four cells of a four-celled embryo of
the corresponding organism.62 In humans, blastomere separation has
been used successfully in preimplantation genetic diagnosis.6
Although this process is experimental, invasive, and costly, it provides
regulating human development. On the other hand, these preliminary
results are viewed by many as the opening of the Pandora's box and
there are loud voices clamoring that research in these areas be forbidden
in perpetuity.
Id.
mSee Genomics: A Global Resource, supra note 51, at <http:/J209.52.56.28!exicon
/s.html>. Defining somatic cell nuclear transfer as:
A process whereby the nucleus of a somatic cell is removed and placed
into an enucleated oocyte (i.e., an egg cell that has had its ownm nucleus
Le,. all genetic information removed). The net result is to have the
genetic information from the donor nucleus in control of the renlting
cell. With further manipulation, such cells can be induced to form
embryos. This process was used to create the cloned shcep "Dally."
Id.
55See Fredrickson, supra note 52, at 274-84.
5 See id
57See Howard W. Jones Jr., Robert G. Edwards, & George E. Seidel Jr., On Attemp13 at
Cloning in the Human, 61 FERTuLIY & STuRIrTY 3, 424 (1994).
'See id
59See id
6°See TABER'S, supra note 19, at 2013 (defining totipotent as capable of differentiating
into a large variety of cells).61See Jones, supra note 57, at 423-26.
6See id. at 423.
6See id. at 425.
2000]
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a means by which women who are carriers for autosomal recessive or
X-linked conditions may avoid prenatal diagnosis while obtaining
definitive information about the genetic status of their in vitro
embryos.6
Embryo splitting is a bisection technique used in the cattle
industry in order to increase the production of prize calves. 65  The
method calls for blastocysts66 obtained commercially by flushing them
from the uterus after the cow has been artificially inseminated. On
average, bisection of the blastocyst produces 1.5 times more calves per
blastocyst than would otherwise be obtained.68 In humans, however,
this method has not been successful, apparently because acquisition of
blastocysts by uterine flushing usually fails, and oocytes fertilized in
vitro seldom reach the blastocyst stage with present culture systems.
69
Howard Jones and his colleagues claim that blastocyst transfer "has
itself not been found to offer any advantages over the transfer of
cleaving preembryos."
70
Human blastocyst splitting has nonetheless been proposed as a
means by which treatment of infertility may be enhanced.7 To that
end, a prize-winning paper was presented at the Conjoint Annual
Meeting of the American Fertility Society and the Canadian Fertility
and Andrology Society in 1993. 72 The paper, entitled Experimental
Cloning of Human Polyploid Embryos Using an Artificial Zona
Pellucida, by a team of researchers from George Washington
University in Washington, DC, precipitated a brief but intense media
6See id.65See id. at 423.
(6See Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative in KANT-FouNDAToNs
OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46 (Lewis White Beck, trans., 2d ed. 1990) ("Act so that you
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as
a means only").67See Jones, supra note 57, at 423.68See id.69See id. at 424.
7
"See id This criticism may not apply to somatic cell nuclear transfer, whether used for
cattle or humans. Some scientists believe that this technique may be at least as efficient as In
vitro fertilization of cows. See Gina Kolata, Japanese Scientists Clone a Cow, Making 8
Copies, N.Y. TmiEs, Dec. 9, 1998, at A8.
71See Jones, supra note 57, at 423.
72See id
[Vol. 3:495
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frenzy concerning the possibility of human cloning! 3 Although the
authors claimed that their results pointed the way to improved
treatment of infertility, their research had not been conducted on
normal human embryos of either fertile or infertile couples.7 4 Because
all of the seventeen embryos utilized in their experiment were
abnormal, none of the separated blastocysts that developed in vitro was
considered suitable for transfer to potential mothers.75 Even if they had
been suitable, Jones and his colleagues doubt that the method would be
therapeutically effective or efficient.
76
From an ethical point of view, public discussion of the social
implications of human cloning provoked by the work of the George
Washington University investigators was probably valuable. As is their
wont, bioethicists positioned themselves on different sides of the issue,
some arguing that the technique simply adds another reproductive
option to the mix to which couples already are entitled, so long as they
are aware of, and have freely consented to, its risks to themselves and
their potential offspring." Others argued that cloning marks a point
beyond the morally acceptable scope of medical assistance in
reproduction;78 for them, issues such as the loss of genetic uniqueness
across generations was particularly problematic. 7 9  Others still
addressed the issue as one more illustration of the human arrogance
involved in medical manipulation of the normal and natural
reproductive process.
80
73See J.L. Hall, D. Engel, P.R. Gindoff, G.L. Mottla & RJ. Stillman, Fpcrimantal
Cloning of Human Polyploid Embryos Using an Artificial Zona Pellucida, Paper prcented at
the Conjoint Annual Meeting of the American Fertility Society and the Canadian Fertility and
Andrology Society, General Program Prize Paper, Oct. 13, 1993.
74See Jones, supra note 57, at 425.
75See id. at 424.
76See id at 425.
77See Lori B. Andrews, Mom, Dad, Clone: Implications for Reproductive PrivaiT, 7
CAmmRnGE Q. HEA.THCARE ETmcs 1, 176-86 (1998) (recapping the major arguments for and
against human somatic cell nuclear transplantation).
78See id
79See Jones, supra note 57, at 425.
SSee Andrews, supra note 77, at 176-86. Lori B. Andrews puts this point most
forcefully when she compares cloning to incest, identifying the risk it entails as "hubris" or
"abuse of power." See id at 183.
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Interestingly, while some bioethicists expressed concerns about
the impact of human cloning on cloned individuals,81 none, to my
knowledge, indicated that there were gender differences to worry about
as well. In fact, however, as with medical technologies already
available to assist infertile men or women, human cloning from
embryos entails disproportionate burdens for women. More women
than men are affected by the process because of the separability of
gestation and genetics and because sperm are so much more numerous
and accessible than ova.82 Even if an equal number of men and women
participated in the process, women alone would be undergoing the
risks, pain, and discomfort of ova stimulation, ova retrieval, embryo
transfer, gestation, and childbirth.83
The third method of embryo cloning is nuclear transplantation.84
This involves the transfer of the nucleus of an embryo into an egg from
which the nucleus has been removed.85 Extensive studies show that
sixty to seventy percent of calves cloned through this method from very
early embryos are completely normal morphologically 86  and
genetically.87 If this method were applied to humans, it could introduce
an extra risk for women because twenty to thirty percent of the cloned
calves are transiently much larger than normal, requiring cesarean
section delivery. Until the birth of "Dolly," there were no reports of
successful cloning of mammals from nonembryonic nuclei. 8
8
'See Jones, supra note 57, at 426.
82See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992) (explaining that women suffer
more trauma then men from the IVF process).





8 See Gina Kolata, Scientist Reports First Cloning Ever of Adult Mammal, N.Y. TIMnS,
February 23, 1997, at 20. I put the name "Dolly" in quotation marks as a means of calling
attention to the fact that the name chosen by the researchers has offended some people, albeit
not the person in whose "honor" the lamb was named. "Dolly" was cloned from mammary
tissue and was reportedly named after Dolly Parton, who is well known for her mammary
tissue.
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NUCLEAR TRANSFER FROM MATURE SOMATIC CELLS 9
The belief that cloning from adult cels was impossible was based on
evidence that irreversible nuclear changes have occurred through
differentiation.90 In amphibia, some development from differentiated
cells had been induced in the past, but the resultant organisms never
progressed to maturity. 91 Researchers who wished to clone animals
from the nuclei of mature cells attempted to reverse differentiation and
to reprogram development.92 By establishing a state of quiescence in
the nuclei of the donor cels obtained, they induced the nucleus to
respond to the cytoplasmic93 environment of the zygote,94 triggering
development into a whole "new" organism.9, This whole new
organism is in fact genetically identical to the adult that provided the
mature cells. Although its developmental stage is earlier, the age of the
DNA in the younger individual or clone is the same as that of the adult
donor.96 This has led to concerns about possible acquired mutations in
the tissue that is cloned.
97
In their letter to Nature early in 1997, Ian Wilmut and his
colleagues reported that they had induced quiescence in the nuclei of
cells taken from sheep at different stages of development, all of which
involved some differentiation: a nine-day old embryo, a tWenty-six-day
old fetus, and a six-year old ewe in the last trimester of pregnancy.9 8
From 277 attempts to clone adult (mammary gland) tissue, 172
attempts from the fetal (fibroblast)99 tissue and 385 attempts from the
"This section is taken from MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, GEEs, W o.wE, EqUALrr
282-83 (2000) (Chapter 16: Human Cloning, Women, and Parenthood).
9°See Kolata, supra note 88, at 20.
9 1See id.
92See id.
93See TABER'S, supra note 19, at 490 (defining cytoplasm as the protoplasm of a cell
outside the nucleus).
94See id. at 2812 (defining zygote as the cell produced by the union of two gametes [i.e.,
the fertilized ovum]).
95See Kolata, supra note 88, at 20.
96See Ian Wilmut, A.E. Schnieke, J. McWhir, A.J. Kind & K.LS. Campbell, Viable
Offspring Derivedfrom Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 NAws 810, 810-13 (1997).
97See id
9See id
99See BRuCE ALBERTS, DEms BRAY, JuLLAN LEmWS, MARTni RAFF, K-mi ROBERTS &
JAMES D. WATSON, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OFTHE CELL G-9, 1179-80 (3d. ed. 1994) (defining
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embryonic tissue, eight live lambs were produced: one from the adult
cells, three from the fetal cells and four from the embryonic cells.
100
One of the lambs developed from fetal cells died within a few minutes
of birth. 10 1 Since the birth announcement of "Dolly," however, the low
success rate has improved significantly because many more clones have
been produced from fetal bovine cells of males and females and from
mature female cells of other nonhuman animals. I0 2 In comparison with
clones of sheep and cattle, the clones of mice are particularly useful to
investigators because of their shorter life cycle and the relative ease
with which they can be maintained and studied in laboratories.
10 3
Although clones from adult male cells have been attempted, none
has as yet been successful. 1' 4 With "Dolly," for example, multiple
ewes, but no male sheep, were directly involved in her production.
10 5
Her entire set of genes came from the mammary gland of one ewe,
106
which may therefore be called her genetic mother and father. Richard
Lewontin, a Harvard University geneticist, alleges that her genetic
mother and father were the genetic parents of her immediate progenitor,
but those sheep were obviously not directly involved in "Dolly's"
development. I1 7 "Dolly" may be viewed as both the identical twin and
daughter of the ewe from whose tissue she was formed; the parents of
that ewe might also be described as her grandparents.
fibroblast as a common cell type of connective tissue that secretes collagen and other
molecules, and migrates and proliferates in wounded tissue and artificial laboratory cell
growths.)
1'°See Wilmut, supra note 96, at 810-13.
101See id.
'
02See Gina Kolata, Cows Cloned in First Case Like Dolly's, Japanese Say, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 1998, at A8; Elizabeth Pennisi, Cloned Mice Provide Company for Dolly, 281 SCIENCE
495-96 (1998).
'°
3See Pennisi, supra note 102, at 495-96.
104Of the three types of adult cells from which mouse cloning was attempted, cumulus
(from females), sertoli (from males), and neural cells (from either sex), only the cumulus cells
yielded successful results. See T. Wakayama, A.C.F. Perry, M. Zuccotti, K.R. Johnson & R.
Yanagimachi, Full-Term Development ofMice from Enucleated Ooctyes Injected with Cumulus
Cell Nuclei, NATURE 394 (1998).
05See Wilmut, supra note 96, at 810-13.
"°See id
107See Richard C. Lewontin, The Confusion over Cloning, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BooKs, Oct. 23, 1997, at 18-23.
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"Dolly" had two additional biological mothers: the ewe whose egg
was enucleated' 0 8 to make room for the DNA obtained from the
progenitor ewe, and the ewe to which the re-nucleated egg was
transferred after development commenced. 0 9 Moreover, "Dolly"
might have had a fourth biological mother. After the gestating ewe
gave birth to her, "Dolly" might have been nursed by another ewe still,
as happens with women who serve as "wet nurses" for other women's
offspring. Whichever ewe nursed "Dolly," whether gestationally or
genetically related to her or not, is probably the one that "Dolly" herself
would have regarded as her mother.
Cloning through somatic cell"0 nuclear transplantation"' from
adults not only involves multiple females in reproductive roles, but may
involve no males at all. While strictly speaking this is not equivalent to
parthenogenesis" 2 because the progenitor ewe was derived from male
and female gametes, the process could continue in a parthenogenetic
manner, i.e., through females alone." 3 If and when male clones are
produced from the DNA of adult males, females will still be required to
provide ova, gestation, and lactation. These disparate biological roles
of females are not without risk, discomfort, and invasiveness. While
raising questions about the meaning of parenthood in general and
motherhood in particular, the production of "Dolly" also illustrates a
103See SDm-N's CONCIS fmICAL DICTIONARY 339 (20th cd. 1994) (defining
enucleate as the remoal of the nucleus of the cell).
'
09See Wilmut, supra note 96, at 810-13.
"
0See ALBERTS, supra note 99, at 1012 (providing a detailed explanation of cell
proliferation in sexual reproduction and stating that "a useful distinction can be drawn between
the cells of the germ line, from which the next generation of gametes will be derived, and the
somatic cells, which form the rest of the body and ultimately leave no progeny").
".See Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the National Bicethics
Advisory Commission, 38 JUIME-'RCS J. 3, 3 (1997) (defining somatic cell nuclear
transplantation through use of nuclei derived from somatic cells other than thozEc of an embryo
or fetus. Essentially, nuclei from cells derived from an adult animal can be "reprogrammed,"
or the full genetic complement of a cell can be reactivated well into the chronological life of the
cell.).
"
2See ALmBETS, supra note 99, at 1021 (defining parthenogenesis as reproduction from
an egg activated by some means, such as a chemical or physical treatment, other than contact
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social tendency that the Human Genome Project 114 has accentuated: a
genetic bias.
THE GENETIC BIAS OF HUMAN CLONING AND
INFERTILITY TREATMENT" 5
The goals of nonhuman cloning include the improvement of food
production and development of therapeutic modalities for use in
humans.116 These goals parallel those that have long been pursued in
plant genetics. 117  In contrast, the principal goal of human embryo
cloning, as it has developed thus far, is more effective treatment of
infertility. In conjunction with that goal, cloning is a means by which
women may avoid invasive procedures that they would otherwise
undergo for treatment of their own or their partner's infertility. For
example, the cloning of embryos already retrieved eliminates the need
for further ovulation stimulation and ova retrievals in subsequent
attempts to achieve pregnancy. In time, embryo cloning could also be
more cost effective in treating infertility. From an egalitarian
standpoint, these advantages of embryo cloning for some women and
for society-at-large are desirable and justifiable so long as they are not
purchased at the cost of greater disadvantages for women or others who
are already disadvantaged.
"
4See Human Genome Project MCET <http:llwww.mcet.edulgenome/overview.html>
(describing the Human Genome Project as an international research program designed to
construct detailed genetic and physical maps of the human genome, to determine the complete
nucleotide sequence of human DNA, to localize the estimated 50,000-100,000 genes within the
human genome, and to perform similar analyses on the genomes of several other organisms
used extensively in research laboratories as model systems).
'"This section is taken from MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, GENES, WOMEN, EQUALITY
283-89 (2000) (Chapter 16: Human Cloning, Women, and Parenthood).
"
6See P. Frati, Bioethics, Biotechnology Products and Humans: Europe Between the
Skilled Theseus and the Labyrinth-Minotaur's Syndrome, 3 FORUM (GENOVA) 1, 99-105 (1999)
(discussing the principles and societal implications of plant and animal genetic manipulation,);
A. Colman, Dolly, Polly and Other 'Ollys': Likely Impact of Cloning Technology on
Biomedical Uses ofLivestock, 15 GENEr ANAL 1, 167-73 (1999) (discussing the beneficial uses
of generating transgenic livestock, such as producing an anti-hemophilia protein).
7 1n the plant world, "genetically identical copies of whole organisms are...commonly
referred to as "varieties" rather than clones." See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL Biom'mncs ADVISORY COMMISsION 13-14 (1997).
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From that same standpoint, another projected goal of human
cloning is problematic, viz., cloning one individual to provide treatment
for another, e.g., through organ or tissue donation.1 In Kantian
language, the obvious moral problem raised by such a situation is that a
person is treated as a means rather than an end. 9 Years ago, that
question was considered by Mary and Abe Ayala, whose teen age
daughter, Anissa, was suffering from chronic myelogenous leukemia,
which required bone marrow donation for effective treatment 1 20
Because neither they nor their son was a tissue match for Anissa and no
other compatible donor could be found, the parents decided to try to
have another child, hoping that he or she would provide the desired
match.121 The attempt required a reversal of Abe's vasectomy.12 Even
if the reversal were successfully performed, the couple realized the
probability that their newborn would be a match was only one in
four.123 Regardless of whether the infant was a tissue match for their
daughter, however, they said they would love and care for the child as
fully as they loved and cared for Anissa124 In other words, their
motives were mixed, as is true of most people most of the time. In
time, their hope was fulfilled: their second daughter, Marissa, was a
match to Anissa, and became a donor to her sister when she was
181Embryo stem cells, which can be produced from blastocysts derived from human
clones, may also make it possible to grow healthy tissue or organs, rather than whole
organisms, to replace their unhealthy counterparts in the cloned individual. Cf Eliot Marshall,
Use of Stem Cells Still Legally Murky. but Hearing Offers Hope, SCIeCE, Dec. 11, 1998, at
282. If the human blastocyst from which the replacement develops in vitro has no moral status,
this application is less problematic than the deliberate development of whole organisms solely
for the purpose of their serving as organ or tissue donors. Development of whole organisms
can only occur through women's bodies. Nevertheless, the development of replaceable tissue
or organs in the laboratory also depends on women for provision of the oocytes in which the
cloned DNA can grow. See id
119See STDMwAN'S hfEnicAL DICTIONARY 1858 (26th ed. 1995) (stating that blastocyzs
consist of the inner cell mass and a thin layer of trophoblasts that enclose the blastocoele 9r
cleavage cavity of the embryo, the trophoblast cells contributing to formation of the placenta
rather than the embryo itself).
" OSee Sally Ann Stewvart, Toddler May Be Sister's Lifesaver, USA TODAY, June 4, 1991,
at A3.
1'2 See id
'2See Bob Brown, 20/20, (ABC News television broadcast, Nov. 6, 1997).
123See Stewart, supra note 120, at A3.
124See id
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fourteen months old.125 About a year later, Anissa was healthy enough
to walk down the aisle at her wedding, with Marissa serving as flower
girl.
126
If the Ayala family could have cloned Anissa to produce another
child, they would have thereby insured a match for bone marrow
donation to her. Just as in the actual case, they probably would have
indicated their intention to love and care for Anissa's identical twin as
they did for her. They might wonder, however, whether in time the
identical twin might develop the same condition as Anissa, needing
donation from another identical twin who might be cloned, need
donation for another, and so on for each cloned generation. Moreover,
Anissa's own consent to provide her DNA for insertion into her
mother's enucleated egg would be ethically required. 127 The cloning
process would be accomplished through somatic cell nuclear
transplantation unless Anissa herself had been generated from an
embryo formed through embryo splicing, and the untransferred
genetically identical embryos had been frozen for future use.1
2 8
If Anissa's bone marrow donor had been produced by cloning
Anissa and by having Anissa's mother gestate and give birth to her, the
question of who is the mother is complicated not only by biology but
also by psychology, i.e., by the set of relationships already formed
between mother and daughter. Moreover, the rationale for cloning in
this case is morally different from that of those who support the
procedure solely on grounds of reproductive choice. 129 The desire of
the Ayalas to have a genetically related offspring was based on their
desire to cure another offspring rather than the desire to replicate their
own genes. 130  In fact, if they had found a non-related donor who




26See Transplant Sisters Celebrate a Wedding, BOSTON GLOBE, June 6, 1992, at 4.
127For an account of Anissa's case and further discussion, see HILDE LINDEMANN NELSON
& JAMES LiNDEmAN NELSON, THE PATENT IN THE FAMILY 156-57 (1995).
'2See id
129See generally John A. Robertson, CHILDREN OF CHOICE (1994) (discussing unexplored
ethical implications of cloning in the context of organ or tissue donation as the end goal).
130See Transplant Sisters, supra note 126, at 4.
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Two cases mentioned in the President's Commission Report on
Human Cloning 131 provide better examples than the preceding case of a
genetic bias, i.e., a tendency to prefer offspring who are genetically
related to oneself.
[Case One] A couple wishes to have children, but both adults
are carriers of a lethal recessive gene. Rather than risk the
one in four chance of conceiving a child who will suffer a
short and painful existence, the couple considers the
alternatives: to forgo rearing children; to adopt; to use
prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion; to use donor
gametes free of the recessive trait; or to use the cells of one of
the adults and attempt to clone a child. To avoid donor
gametes and selective abortion, while maintaining a genetic
tie to their child, they opt for cloning.13 2
[Case Two] A family is in a terrible accident. The father is
killed, and the only child, an infant, is dying. The mother
decides to use some cells from the dying infant in an attempt
to use somatic cell nuclear transfer to create a new child. It is
the only way she can raise a child who is the biological
offspring of her late husband. 3 3
In Case One, the couple clearly desires to have a child genetically
related to both of them, while free of a genetic disease; they also desire
to avoid prenatal testing and abortion. 134  But another desire is
suggested by the case description: avoidance of a short and painful
existence on the part of an affected child. 135 Shortness of lifespan does
not necessarily limit the quality of someone's life, but the shortness of a
child's life are likely to cause suffering for the parents, thereby limiting
their quality of life.
Unfortunately, the Commission does not indicate the nature of the
recessive disorder for which the parents are both carriers, nor does it
1'3 See Cloning Human Beings, Report and Recommendation of the National Biohics
Advisory Commission 79 (1997) [hereinafter Cloning Human Beings].132See id. at 78-79.
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define the type of condition it considers "lethal." Sickle cell anemia 136
and cystic fibrosis 137 are the most common recessive conditions in
African Americans and Caucasians, respectively, but affected
individuals typically survive to adulthood and beyond.138 Tay Sachs
disease, a recessive, progressive, neurological disorder that particularly
affects Ashkenazi Jews, is considered lethal because those who are
affected die in early childhood. 139  Whether the experience of the
disease is painful to the child, however, depends on the systems
affected, the treatments administered, and whether adequate palliation
is provided. In light of these possibilities, it is questionable whether
even the most severe genetic disease necessarily entails pain for the
person affected. Parents, however, surely experience a great deal of
anguish or suffering in the course of caring for an affected child.
The desire to be a parent is as natural and good as the desire to
have a genetically-related child, but the two desires are not the same,
and the fulfillment of neither is essential to one's health or life.
Choosing to remain childless in a situation such as Case One may not
only be morally permissible but commendable, depending on its
rationale. Adoption is also a morally commendable option. Neither
childlessness nor adoption illustrates the genetic bias that supposedly
motivates the couple's desire for cloning. In contrast, Case One
suggests a gender-based genetic bias on the part of the President's
Commission. The Commission represents the genetic tie as the most
important one for the potential parents, ignoring the non-genetic
biological tie that the woman may have through gestation and
childbirth. Egg donation in this case would allow both partners to
avoid the risk of transmitting the genetic condition for which they are
carriers.
Case Two illustrates cloning itself as the objective of reproductive
assistance. Presumably, the woman could have another child through
adoption, artificial insemination by a donor, or sexual intercourse with
a new partner, but she apparently desires not only to raise a child who
136See RIcHARD C. LEWONTIN, HUMAN Dvmusrr 124-25 (2d. ed 1995).
'37See LUiGI LUCA CAVALLI-SFoRZA & FRANCESCO CAVALU-SFORZA, THE GREAT
HUMAN DIASPORAS: THE HISTORY OF DiESITY AND EVOLUriON 249 (1995).
138See LEWONTIN, supra note 136, at 124-25; CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 137, at 249.
'39See LEWONTIN, supra note 136, at 156.
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is genetically related to her but to insure that the child be the genetic
duplicate of her son. Of course, the genetic duplicate would not be the
same person as the son who is dying; rather, he would be the son's
.identical twin, born several years later and genetically related to her
dead husband and to her. Interestingly, the woman's genetic bias in
this case is mainly oriented towards propagating another's genes rather
than her own. She could, after all, replicate the entirety of her own
genome by cloning herself, or she could be as genetically related to a
new child as to her dying son by simply repeating the process through
which the latter had been conceived.
From an egalitarian standpoint, the woman's desire to have her
son cloned is an understandable instance of genetic bias, but cannot be
justified on that basis alone. Unlike the Ayala case, which involved the
goal of effective treatment for a child already born, this case involves
no effective treatment for anyone. In fact, the woman's recovery from
the loss of her husband and son might be impeded by the attempt to
replicate the genetic contribution of one and the genome of the other.
Although the Ayala case also raises the question of treating a child as a
means rather than an end, this case raises that question yet more
problematically because the clone is apparently desired for more
individualistic than therapeutic reasons.
As already mentioned, the desire for a genetic tie to offspring is
natural and prevalent, but less strong in many women than in men.140
While both men and women prefer to have children biologically rather
than through adoption, the gestational tie established through
pregnancy may be at least as important as the genetic tie for women.
To the extent that the genetic tie induces individuals to stay together
and to protect and nurture one another, it is surely a good thing.
Interestingly, however, the origin of families is precisely not a genetic
tie between parents themselves. Despite the high incidence of divorce
in contemporary society,141 the fact that so many couples do stay
140See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHL L. REv. 209, 239-40 (1995);
Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L REV. 623, 623
(1991); John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human
Egg Donation, 39 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 1(1989).141See Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women's Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for
Contextual Coercion, 47 BuFF. L. REv. 1153, fin 17 (1999) (stating that "[s]ome predict that
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together and protect and nurture each other argues for the enduring
significance of nongenetic ties. The nongenetic tie between partners is
reinforced in most societies by their choosing each other as mature
individuals who are aware, to some degree at least, of each other's
strengths and weaknesses.
The lack of a genetic link between stepchildren and one of their
social parents has been associated with a higher incidence of violence
in their families, as compared with the families of adoptive children
and families in which all of the children are genetically related to both
parents. 142 Adoption represents the desire of both parents to have a
child who is not genetically related to either of them; egg or sperm
donation represents a desire to have a child genetically related to one
but not both; a couple's decision to initiate or continue a pregnancy to
which both have contributed their gametes represents a desire to have a
child who is genetically related to both parents. Each of these scenarios
involves a specific decision on the part of both partners to be parents.
In contrast, stepfamilies are formed by partners' choosing each other,
but not necessarily choosing to be parents of children produced through
previous relationships. The fact that ties between children and their
adoptive parents tend to be stronger than ties between stepparents and
their stepchildren suggests the importance not only of nongenetic ties
but also of the autonomy of both partners in decisions to have children.
Children themselves, whether adopted or not, do not have that
opportunity. Another factor that may contribute to successful parenting
by adoptive couples is the fact that they are usually screened by
professionals for their suitability to be parents.
143
While a genetic bias is natural, prevalent, and good in most
instances, it can lead to social inequities as well. Consider, for
example, the fact that medical and technological assistance in acquiring
genetically related offspring is a growth industry whose benefits are
virtually unavailable to the poor, who are just as apt, or more apt, than
more than one-half of all marriages in the United States will end in divorce," and that "[s]ome
predict an even higher percentage").
4?See Jane E. Brody, Genetic Ties May Be Factor in Violence in Stepfamilies, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1998, at C1.
143See Remi j. Cadoret, Adoption Studies, ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD, June 1,
1995, at 195 (explaining that adoption is not a random process because agencies carefully
screen adoptive parents).
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the affluent to be infertile. 144 Consider also the economic disparity that
usually prevails between gamete donors and their recipients. 45 In a
sense, the former sell their genes in order to allow others to (re)produce
their partners' genes. 146 The greater reluctance of women to be egg
donors than of men to be sperm donors is undoubtedly influenced by
the greater invasiveness and risk of egg donation. 7  A woman's
reluctance may also be influenced by her limited number of eggs and a
desire to insure her own capability for pregnancy and childbirth. 14
Commercial surrogacy is perhaps a clearer illustration of social
inequity associated with a genetic bias. When the surrogate is both
gestationally and genetically related to the offspring, she, like an egg
donor, sells her genes so that someone can fulfill his genetic bias. If
she is not genetically related, she contributes to the genetic bias of both
partners whose embryo she gestates.
Human somatic cell nuclear transfer offers the prospect of extreme
and unnatural genetic bias. It is extreme because it entails the
contribution of not only half but all of one's genetic material. 14  It is
unnatural because this never occurs in nature. 150 Both factors make
human somatic cell nuclear transfer radically different from other
modes of reproductive assistance. The other modes conform to the
model of combining gametes from a male and female to produce
genetically new offspring related to both of the contributing partners.
Human somatic cell nuclear transfer might be more accurately
described as replicative assistance than reproductive assistance.
Replicative assistance might be further characterized as radically
144See Roberts, supra note 140, at 244 (stating that the high cost of fertility treatment
largely restricts its availability to only the affluent).
'
45See id at 247 (stating that people who hire surrogates for in vitro fertilization
procedures are usually wealthier than the women who provide the service).
146see ial
147See Gina Kolata, Price Soars for Eggs, Setting Off a Debate on a Clinic's Ethics, N.Y.
TmiEs, Feb. 25, 1998, at Al (stating that, in contrast to the availability of sperm, eggs are in
short supply, requiring potential recipients to wait a year or more for donor eggs. To entice egg
donors, one infertility clinic has raised its payment to them toS5,000 for a month's worth of
eggs. This is twenty times what donors were typically paid when the practice began over a
decade ago. Clinicians may encourage use of donor eggs from younger women becaue-c it
improves their success rate in treating older women, attracting more infertility patients.).
14'See d
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conservative because it attempts to preserve a phenotype that has
already been expressed, forgoing not only the risk of a new genetic
combination but also the possibility of a superior phenotype. 151
Beyond the priority that many women impute to the gestational
link to their offspring, a genetic bias has historically been associated
more with men than with women.152 Without recognizing that
infertility in couples is as likely due to the male partner as the female
partner, 153 women have in fact been blamed for childlessness. In
biblical times, the "barrenness" of a woman was grounds for her
husband's "lying" with another woman in order to have a child, or, if
his wife had only had daughters, to have a son. 154  The practice of
women taking their husbands' surnames is a way of indicating the
male's genetic lineage only.' 55 Although sperm "donation" is mainly
undertaken for money, the keener interest of men in sperm "donation"
than women in egg donation suggests that men may also be motivated
by a desire to propagate their own genetic endowment. Women are
sometimes prone to support that motivation on the part of their
partners, resorting to extreme measures to have children genetically
related to their husbands.'56 In postmenopausal gestation, for example,
women undergo hormonal stimulation, embryo transfer, and gestation
after in vitro fertilization of donor egg's with their husband's sperm in
order to give birth to children who are genetically unrelated to them.157
The language in which adoptive parents and biological parents are
sometimes described also connotes a genetic bias. The latter, for
example, are sometimes called "real" parents, even if they have never
been involved in parental nurturance. In Chicago, for example, in
'
5t See CAVAL I-SFORzA, supra note 137, at 74-105 (discussing the molecular mechanism
of human genetic recombination and the evolutionary adaptive advantages and disadvantages
of human genetic diversity).
152See Roberts, supra note 140, at 239-40.153See id.
1 4See Genesis 16:1-2.
5
-
5See Merle H. Weiner, We Are Family: Valuing Associationalism in Disputes Over
Children's Surnames, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1625, 1625 (1997) (providing an in-depth discussion of
.men's and women's viewpoints on bestowing surnames and their historical and societal
implications); Omi, The Name of the Maiden, 12 Wis. WOMEN'S L. J. 253, 253 (1997).
"
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the early 1990s a child known as Baby Richard was adopted by a
couple who cared for him from his fourth day of life until he was nearly
four years of age.1 59 At that point, the couple was ordered by ajudge to
surrender the child to his genetic father.160 The child had been
conceived in the course of an affair after which the genetic father went
abroad and developed another sexual liaison.161  On giving birth,
Richard's biological (gestational and genetic) mother legally
surrendered the child to the couple who became his adoptive parents.
162
When the genetic father learned of the boy's birth he initiated a legal
effort to take him from his adoptive home, claiming he had a right to do
so because he was the child's "real" father. 63 Although the genetic
father married the biological mother while engaged in his effort to take
Richard from his adoptive family, her "real" motherhood status was
neither acknowledged nor legally restored, even after her husband
separated from her and Richard several years later.'16
REAL PARENTS, REAL MOTHERS16 '
Was Baby Richard's genetic father his real father? Genetically, he was
as really the boy's father as a sperm donor is the real father of a child
he never intended to see or nurture. Comparing the two, the sperm
donor is intentionally a genetic parent, while Baby Richard's genetic
father was not, at least until sometime after the child was born. Sperm
166donors never become legal parents; in most states, the husband of a
159See In re Petition of Doe, 649 N.E.2d 324, 326-27 (IlM. 1994). Scc also Scott A.
Resnik, Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon: Defining the Rights of Unwcd Fathcrs in Mewbhrn





16See In re Petition of Doe, 649 N.E.2d at 326-27. The basis for the ruling againzt the
child's adoptive parents was the fact that the biological father did not consent to the adoption.
See id, Opposition to the ruling was mainly based on the fact that the child's best interests
should have been the grounds for determining his placement. See id at 349-52.
1
"See Mark Brown & Adrienne Drell, Baby Richard Battle Back in Coa't, Cru ST.1-
TIMEs, July 17, 1997, at 1.
1'his section is taken from MARY BRIODY MAnOWALD, GmuEs, WO.m,, EU.ALrTY
289-92 (2000) (Chapter 16: Human Cloning, Women, and Parenthood).
166See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? 7L- Claims ofBiology
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 373 (1991) Hill states tha under
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woman who is artificially inseminated with donor sperm is considered
the child's legal father. 6 7  Richard's genetic father became his legal
father only after a lengthy court battle and a controversial judicial
decision. 16  He was the child's only legal parent even after he left the
family, while Richard's biological mother remained to care of him even
though she was not legally his parent. 169  Once removed from his
adoptive family, Richard had no legal mother. 
170
A different view of what constitutes a real parent was articulated
by a sperm donor in a letter to his potential genetic offspring: "I am not
your parent," he wrote, even though I am your (genetic) father because
I never gave you anything. I never held you or cared for You. The man
who did those things for you is your real parent." 171 From an
egalitarian perspective, something similar might be said by an egg
donor. Because of the physical demands and risk of egg "donation,"
however, it is less likely that a woman who provides gametes would
current statutory law, paternity is largely presumed. Id. He further notes that, under the
Uniform Parentage Act of California, for example, a third party may assert paternal rights only
when there is no presumed father under another section of the Act. Id. Therefore, the husband
of the mother of the child retains legal rights simply by virtue of his relationship with the
mother. Iad The legal standing between a nonbiologically related father and child remains
steadfast even in the context of permitting consensual artificial insemination by a sperm donor.
Il This rule protects the paternal status of the surrogate's husband while simultaneously
providing that the sperm donor is not to be considered the father of the child. Id. Professor
Hill underscored that this presumption applies only in marital relationships and does not extend
to either heterosexual or homosexual cohabitation. Id.
167See id See also New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, Assisted
Reproductive Technologies: Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy (1998) (citing
New York law making the husband of a woman who is artificially inseminated with donor
semen the legal father of any child born after the insemination, so long as the procedure was
performed by a licensed physician with the husband's consent).
16See In re Petition of Doe, 649 N.E.2d at 349-52 (asserting that the majority opinion
failed to take into account the best interest of the child). From a systemic perspective, it is
important to notify genetic fathers who are not sperm donors so as to promote their support of
children for whom placement resources are limited. In this case, however, by the time the
genetic father learned of his birth and pursued custody, the child had already been legally
placed.
169See Resnik, supra note 159, at 371-75.
'
7 See id
171Some sperm donors have expressed this sentiment as a means of acknowledging their
lack of involvement in the parental role. Genetic information relevant to the sperm donor is
usually provided by him without compromising his desired anonymity. This information is
communicated to the infertile couple or to the woman who is inseminated, to be available to the
child who may be born as a result of the insemination.
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say that she gave her genetic progeny "nothing" even though she is
paid more than a sperm "donor."'72 What sperm donors and egg donors
do have in common is that neither intends to be a parent. For a
woman, that intention tends to be more encompassing than for a man
because it necessarily entails the negation of a greater degree of
involvement through gestation and childbirth, 7 4 and usually entails
negation of a greater degree of responsibility for child care or
nurturance.1
75
If and when human somatic cell nuclear transfer becomes
available, both men and women may donate their DNA with much less
discomfort or risk than a woman undergoes in providing ova. Female
recipients would still be required to gestate and give birth. Because
DNA is so easily obtainable from donors, its value would be negligible
unless the donor was a particularly prized tissue source. Even then, it
would be difficult for such a donor to prevent others from freely
obtaining DNA traces from cells left through routine touching."
6
According to Davor Solter, a molecular geneticist at the Max Planek
Institute, the unique role of women in human somatic cell nuclear
transfer suggests an advantage for them. 7 7 Whether the procedure is
used to generate whole organisms or specific organs or tissue, women's
eggs are necessary to that generation, and "women hold all the eggs.' 73
Solter observes that a woman, therefore, "could use one of her own
eggs to create an organ she needs. But a man would have to buy eggs
from a woman, if he could find a woman to provide them and if he
could afford them."'7 9 Although Solter seems to think that their egg
172f the motivation of gamete "donors" is to obtain money, the term "donor" is
misleading. Although the money that a gamete provider receives in exchange for his or her
gametes is (legally and clinically) described as compensation rather than remuneration, whether
it is one or the other depends on the amount of the "compersation" vis-a-vis the risk and
discomfort for which the provider is "compensated," as well as the economic status and motive
of the gamete provider. In most cases of sperm "donation" and some cases of egg "donation,"
the term "vendor" more accurately describes the gamete provider.
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producing capacity might make women all powerful in society, 18 many
are likely to disagree with that assessment. Most of us, I think, are
likely to construe the fact that we already hold all the eggs as
disempowering, although not necessarily so. Men, after all, have
always depended on women not only to provide eggs but also DNA and
the uterine environment necessary to produce their offspring. So long
as men hold more economic power than women do, further dependence
on women for enucleated eggs is hardly likely to result in reverse
sexism.
In its dependence on use of enucleated eggs, somatic cell nuclear
transfer introduces a new way in which women may be biologically
related to offspring. Even if men provide the entire genetic
complement to an embryo, they remain biologically related to the
eventual offspring through that mode alone. They may in fact be
described as genetic mother and genetic father. But women may be
related biologically through (enucleated) egg provision, through
gestation, and through lactation. Even the enucleated egg contains
mitochondrial DNA 181 which influences the health of the developing
embryo or fetus, regardless of whether the nuclear DNA transferred
into it comes from a male or female progenitor. 182 Through use of one
woman's nuclear DNA and another woman's enucleated egg, a lesbian
couple may have a child who is biologically related to both without
requiring sperm donation.
All of these biological roles for women may be viewed as grounds
for calling them mothers. But are women who serve only as DNA
providers, egg providers, gestation providers, or lactation providers-
real mothers? Certainly they may all be called biological mothers
because they all fulfill biologically determined maternal roles. But are
all biological mothers real mothers or real parents? Traditionally,
mothers have been defined as those who give birth. This definition
implies that gene providers (whether they contribute all or only half of
"OS°ee id
ISee CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 137, at 65-70. (defining mitochondria as once being
free bacteria a billion or so years ago and now being contained in all living cells. Each
mitochondrion contains one or more rings of DNA which operates symbiotically with the
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the recipient's DNA) and enucleated egg providers are not mothers
unless they also gestate and give birth. The traditional definition was
formulated in the absence of the technical possibility of separating
genes from gestation. Probably it was also formulated with the
assumption that one who gives birth goes on to nurse the child, as
gestation and childbirth itself prepare her to do; in other words,
continuity between natural and nurturant roles of mothers was
presumed. Once nurturance is introduced as a maternal function, we
need to recognize that men as well as women can and do nurture
infants. Women alone of course can fulfill the nurturant function of
breast-feeding, but men are fully capable of bottle-feeding, which many
women choose as well. Essential nurturance of infants is thus a
parental function fulfillable by either mothers or fathers. Moreover, it
is fulfillable by men or women who are not biological parents but who
are committed to the child's nurturance, i.e., by adoptive parents,
whether mothers or fathers.
Real motherhood may be defined as encompassing different
demands and degrees of lifegiving, both qualitatively and
quantitatively. Genes as well as environment figure significantly in the
determination of individual traits. 183  In cloning, the individual's
genetic endowment is determined by one parent, whether male or
female.1i 4 But the ovum in which that parent's DNA is inserted
represents a significant environmental influence on development, and
the mitochondrial DNA adds a genetic component to the environment
of the nuclear DNA.185 The individual who provides the egg is another
parent, always female and therefore a mother, who undergoes greater
risk and discomfort through her lifegiving than does the genetic parent.
Another crucial environmental influence is the individual who gestates
and gives birth, one who may be described as another parent and
another mother, who undergoes greater risk and discomfort through her
lifegiving than either of the other parents. In human somatic cell
nuclear transfer, a lactating mother is another significant environmental
influence, but a father or mother who feeds an infant by bottle may be
equally significant.
183See LEWONTIN, supra note 136, at 68-70.
'84ee id.
luSee CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 137, at 65-70.
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As a child develops, however, whether cloned or not, the most
important environmental determinant of the person he or she becomes
is the parent or parents who provide care and nurturance towards
adulthood, regardless of whether they are biologically related to the
child. In time, the adoptive parent becomes more really a parent than
any of the others. A real mother, then, is first and foremost a woman
who cares for a child, from any stage of development, until the child no
longer needs that care. A real father is a man who does the same when
he can, i.e., after the child is born.
CONCLUSION
Ordinarily, real parents contribute to their children both biologically
and environmentally. When they are not biologically-related, their
parenthood is real to the extent that they contribute themselves, Le.,
their love, work, thought, income, communication, etc., throughout the
child's lifetime. By this rationale, if I were asked to compare the
different mothers involved in cloning, I would probably resort to the
traditional definition by saying the woman who gives birth is the real
mother at that point. For some time after birth, a lactating mother could
be a real mother as well. But an adoptive mother would in time be
more real a mother than any of the others, regardless of the lack of a
biological tie to her child.
From the standpoint of gender equality, it is hard to see how
genetic ties alone ever provide an adequate basis for defining real
mothers or real fathers.
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